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The Origins and Original Significance of
the Just Compensation Clause of the
Fifth Amendment
The principle that the state necessarily owes compensation when it
takes private property was not generally accepted in either colonial or rev-
olutionary America. Uncompensated takings were frequent and found jus-
tification first in appeals to the crown and later in republicanism,1 the
ideology of the Revolution. The post-independence movement for just
compensation requirements at the state and national level was part of a
broader ideological shift away from republicanism, which stressed the pri-
macy of the common good, and toward liberalism.2 At the time the Bill of
Rights was adopted, that shift had not been completed, but the trends of
the revolutionary era received coherent expression in the thought of James
Madison, the author of the Fifth Amendment's just compensation clause.3
Madison believed it necessary to erect strong safeguards for rights in gen-
eral and for property rights in particular. His just compensation
clause-although intended to have relatively narrow legal conse-
quences-was such a safeguard. Its ratification represented the translation
of liberal ideology into constitutional principle.
1. Historians have proposed a number of slightly different models of republicanism. The two most
influential models are set forth in B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 34-93 (1967) and in G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC,
1776-1787, at 46-90 (1969). For a comparison of these models with each other and with that of
Professor J.G.A. Pocock, see Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment Revisited: A Study in History and
Ideology, 53 J. WORLD HIsT. 49 (1981).
In republican ideology, society is conceived of in organic terms. The promotion of virtue and the
advancement of the common good are among the primary ends of government. In recent years, histori-
ans have persuasively argued that, to the extent the American Revolution was motivated by ideology,
it was motivated principally by republicanism: Republicanism led Americans to see British govern-
ment as corrupt and a threat to American virtue. See, e.g., B. BAILYN, supra, at 85-104; J. POCOCK,
THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUB-
LICAN TRADITION 507-08 (1975); G. WOOD, supra, at 16-17, 22-33, 30-36, 40-43. For further
discussion of republicanism, see infra pp. 699-701.
2. For the purposes of this Note, liberalism is the ideology that, conceptualizing society in atomis-
tic rather than organic terms, holds the end of government to be the security of individual liberty; this
school of thought received its classic embodiment in the writings of John Locke. For discussion of
liberalism in revolutionary America, see infra pp. 704-05, 709-10. See also C. MACPHERSON, THE
POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO LOCKE 263-71 (discussing the con-
tributions of Locke and Hobbes to liberal thought).
3. The just compensation clause of the Fifth Amendment declares: "[Nior shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Just Compensation Clause
I. TAKINGS LAW BEFORE THE JUST COMPENSATION REQUIREMENT
Neither colonial statutes nor the first state constitutions recognized a
right to receive compensation when the government took property from an
individual. Crown officials justified uncompensated takings by appealing
to royal prerogative and limitations contained in original land grants. The
absence of a just compensation clause in the first state constitutions ac-
corded with the faith in legislatures that was a central element of republi-
can thought and with the position held by many republicans that the
property right could be compromised in order to advance the common
good.
A. Colonial Statutes and the First State Constitutions
Eighteenth-century colonial legislatures regularly took private property
without compensating the owner. In some cases where the owner had
failed to develop his property, ownership was simply transferred to an-
other person.4 The most common type of uncompensated taking, however,
was the taking of private land for public roads. Except for Massachu-
setts,5 no colony appears to have paid compensation when it built a state-
owned road across unimproved land. Legislatures provided compensation
only for enclosed or improved land.'
4. Among the individuals who suffered this fate were those who had built bridges and let them
fall into disrepair, An Act to regulate the Expence of private Bridges, Mass. Stats. ch. X (1743), and
those who did not settle their land, An Act for the laying out of Land, and erecting a Town at a Place
called Broxen's Point, in Cecil County, Md. Stats. (1730); An Act for enlarging the Town of Alexan-
dria, in the County of Fairfax, Va. Stats. ch. XXV (1762); An Act enlarging the Town of Petersburg
. .. , Va. Stats. ch. XXIV (1762); see also P. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOP-
MENT 38 (1968) (escheat of undeveloped land in colonial Virginia); Mensch, The Colonial Origins of
Liberal Property Rights, 31 BUFFALO L. REV. 635, 664-65, 669 (1982) (confiscation of undeveloped
land in New York).
5. Massachusetts compensated landowners even for unimproved land taken for state-owned roads.
See, e.g., An Act in addition to the several Laws of this Province relating to common Roads and
private Ways, Mass. Stats. ch. III (1739); An Act in addition to an Act Intitled, An Act for High-
Ways, Mass. Stats. ch. III (1736); An Act for High-ways, Mass. Stats. (1693). When, however, a
jury assessing damages decided that the road benefited the owner's estate more than the loss of land
for the road harmed it, no compensation was given. See J. PARSONS, A CONSIDERATION OF SOME
UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEASURES, ADOPTED AND PRACTICED IN THIS STATE 17 (Newbury-port,
Mass. 1784). On the role of juries generally in determining damages, see infra note 6.
6. See, e.g., M'Clenachan v. Curwin, 3 Yeates 362, 371-73 (Pa. 1802) (in colonial Pennsylvania,
no compensation due owner when road built across his unimproved land); Lindsay v. Commissioners,
2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 38, 47-51 (1796) (in colonial South Carolina, no compensation paid when govern-
ment took unimproved land); An Act for regulating, clearing and further laying out public Highways
throughout the City and County of Albany, N.Y. Stats. ch. CXCIX (1760) (compensation only for
"cleared or improved Lands"); An Act for the better clearing and further laying out publick High-
Roads in the County of Ulster, N.Y. Stats. ch. XII (1743) (same); An Act for Making, Clearing, and
Repairing the Highways, and for Clearing the Rivers and Creeks, Va. Stats. ch. xxxix (1705) (no
provision for compensation for land taken for roads).
There was only one colony in which improved land appears to have been regularly taken for roads
without compensation. Colonial Virginia road building statutes have no compensation provisions. See,
e.g., An Act for clearing a Road from the Warm Springs in Augusta, and for other Purposes therein
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Such governmental takings generally promoted economic growth: Un-
compensated taking of unimproved land reduced the cost of road build-
mentioned, Va. Stats. ch. XXIV (1772); An Act for Making, Clearing, and Repairing the Highways,
and for Clearing the Rivers and Creeks, Va. Stats. (1705). Furthermore, in his Notes on the State of
Virginia, Thomas Jefferson indicated that in colonial Virginia individuals received no indemnification
when public roads were built on their land. See T. JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA
148 (2d ed. Richmond, Va. 1853) (1st ed. London 1787).
Two recent commentators have offered differing interpretations of the general failure to compensate
when unimproved lands were taken for roads. See M. HORwiTz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERI-
CAN LAW: 1780-1860, at 63-64 (1977); Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH.
L. REV. 553, 582-83 (1972). Horwitz cites this failure to provide payment as indicating that the just
compensation principle had not won general acceptance in colonial America. M. HORWITz, supra, at
63-64. In contrast, Stoebuck contends, "In effect, the colonials made an 'irrebuttable presumption'
. . . that a new road would always give more value than the unenclosed land it occupied had ...
The colonial practice of paying only for unenclosed [sic] land did not deny the general right of com-
pensation." Stoebuck, supra, at 583.
There are two problems with Stoebuck's position. As has been indicated, see supra note 4 and
accompanying text, property was taken without compensation in contexts other than road building. In
addition, the statutes of the colony with the most detailed road building statutes-New York-do not
support Stoebuck's thesis: Colonists did not simply assume that the benefit of a road would exceed the
loss occasioned by taking unimproved land. According to standard New York highway acts, when a
county road was built across unimproved land, the timber on that land could be used, without com-
pensation to the owner, in road building; that timber could not be taken, however, for use in building
a private road. See, e.g., An Act for the better laying out, regulating and keeping in Repair, common,
publick and private High-ways. . . in the County of Orange, N.Y. Stats. ch. CCCLXV (1765); An
Act for regulating, clearing, and further laying out public Highways throughout the City and County
of Albany, N.Y. Stats. ch. CXCIX (1760). The decisive variable explaining the difference in practice
was not benefit to the former owner: He would be benefited by any road that linked his farm to
markets. The decisive variable was the importance of the state interest. Although a county and a
private citizen might confer the same benefit on an owner by building a road through his land, the
county would enjoy the privilege of taking timber without compensation, while the citizen would not.
Colonial governments, of course, recognized a large sphere within which they did not challenge
private property rights. Compensation for takings was regularly made. For example, at least four
New York statutes passed between 1745 and 1755 had compensation provisions: An Act to enable the
Inhabitants of Schenectady, to fortify the said Town, N.Y. Stats. ch. LIII (1755) (allowing town
residents to take private land to be used for construction of fortifications); An Act further to impower
the Justices of the Peace in the County of Albany . . . to drain the Water out of the Streets thereof,
N.Y. Stats. ch. XXVIII (1753) (empowering the justices to build gutters and drains across private
property); An Act for . . . publick High-Roads in the County of Westchester, N.Y. Stats. ch. XIV
(1745); An Act for. . . publick Highways in Kings County, Queens County, Richmond County, and
Orange County, N.Y. Stats. ch. XIII (1745).
While compensation mechanisms varied somewhat from colony to colony, juries were in general
empowered by statute to determine the value of property taken. See, e.g., An Act in addition to the
several Laws of this Province relating to common Roads and private Ways, Mass. Stats. ch. III
(1739); An Act for the better laying out, regulating, and keeping in Repair, common, publick, and
private High-ways. . . in the County of Orange, N.Y. Stats. ch. CCCLXV (1765); An Act to enable
the Inhabitants of Schenectady, to fortify the said Town, N.Y. Stats. ch. LIII (1755). None of the
statutes surveyed provided for judicial appeal of compensation awards, but it appears that, at least in
Massachusetts, the individual could petition the legislature if denied compensation or if given an
amount he deemed inadequate. See J. PARSONS, supra note 5, at 17. In addition, trespass suits could
be brought against individuals who took private property for a public use without proper legislative
authorization. See, e.g., Emmons v. Brewer (Mass. Super. Ct. 1772), reprinted in 2 LEGAL PAPERS
OF JOHN ADAMS 9 (L. Wroth & H. Zobel eds. 1965); Giddings v. Brown (Essex County Court
1657), reprinted in READINGS IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 232 (M. Howe ed. 1952); J. SMITH,
APPEALS TO THE PRIVY COUNCIL FROM THE AMERICAN PLANTATIONS 328-33 (1950) (discussing
trespass suits against individuals purportedly acting under Naval Stores Act in cutting trees on private
property for use by the Royal Navy).
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ing7 ; the transfer of ownership of land and bridges to individuals who
would use such property productively aided development.' A powerful
strand of English legal thought, a strand that had its origins in feudal
notions of property and kingship, legitimized such redistributions. Accord-
ing to this theory, property was held from the state; the state could there-
fore limit the individual's ownership claims.9 The terms of the original
crown or legislative grant generally provided the source of those limita-
tions. Many land grants, for example, required settlement as a condition
for validation. When stripping individuals of title to undeveloped land,
colonial officials were able to justify their actions by maintaining that the
owners (and their predecessors in interest) had failed to honor that
condition.1°
Express grant conditions were not, however, the only limitations on in-
dividual property ownership. In colonial America, takings were also justi-
fied by appeals to the inherent powers of the sovereign. For example, in
his campaign for the seizure of undeveloped land that had been issued
7. For examples of these takings, see supra note 6.
8. For examples of such transfers, see supra note 4. These takings suggest the prevalence in
colonial America of a labor theory of value. Posoession alone did not create a protected interest. Only
the investment of labor in inherited or purchased possessions created a compensable interest.
9. For discussions of English legal history that illustrate the continuing force of this conception of
property, see 4 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 318 (3d ed. 1945); 10 id. at
364-68, 384-88 (Ist ed. 1938); S. MOORE, A HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE AND THE LAWS RELAT-
ING THERETO 420-33 (1888).
At the time of the American Revolution, the principle that the state was obligated to compensate
individuals when it took their property had not won general acceptance in England. Parliament rou-
tinely provided payment to a person whose property was taken for a public use, see Stoebuck, supra
note 6, at 579, but whether the individual had a right to such payment was disputed. Though (un-
characteristically) unable to provide historical support for his position, William Blackstone declared
that compensation was a necessity. Parliament acts, he wrote:
[n]ot by absolutely stripping the subject of his property in an arbitrary manner; but by giving
him a full indemnification and equivalent for the injury thereby sustained. . . . All that the
legislature does is to oblige the owner to alienate his possessions for a reasonable price; and
even this is an exertion of power, which the legislature indulges with caution, and which
nothing but the legislature can perform.
I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *140.
Citation to Blackstone did not, however, impress the bench in British Cast Plate Mfrs. Co. v.
Meredith, [1792] 100 Eng. Rep. 1306, a road building case and apparently the only 18th-century
English opinion to address the issue of government takings of private property, see Burmah Oil Co. v.
Lord Advocate, [1964] 2 All E.R. 348, 354-55 (Reid, J.). The Meredith court noted in dicta that
neither reason nor precedent supported the argument that the judiciary could impose compensation
that Parliament had not authorized. Chief Justice Kenyon declared, "If the Legislature think it neces-
sary, as they do in many cases, they enable the [road] commissioners to award satisfaction to the
individuals who happen to suffer; but if there be no such power, the parties are without remedy,
provided the commissioners do not exceed their jurisdiction .... " 100 Eng. Rep. at 1307. Justice
Buller noted, "There are many cases in which individuals sustain an injury, for which the law gives
no action. . . . This is one of those cases to which the maxim applies, salus populi suprema est lex."
Id. at 1307-08.
10. See P. GATES, supra note 4, at 38 (escheat in Virginia); S. LIVERMORE, EARLY AMERICAN
LAND COMPANIES 23-24 (1939) (in colonial New England, settlement or cultivation required to
validate land grants); Mensch, supra note 4, at 664 (threatened confiscation in colonial New York
though current owner not original grantee).
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 94: 694, 1985
under grants containing no explicit condition of settlement, New York
Governor Bellomont successfully argued that the absence of such a restric-
tion undermined royal authority and was "very presumptuous and unnat-
ural"; lack of an explicit restriction thus did not bar revocation."
Although independence ended appeals to royal authority as sanctioning
takings, it did not immediately lead to general acknowledgment of the
principle of just compensation. Uncompensated takings of private property
occurred regularly in the revolutionary era. Loyalist property was
seized. 12 Undeveloped land was taken for roads.13 Goods of all types were
impressed for military use.14 None of the first state constitutions featured
a just compensation requirement. Only three had clauses concerning tak-
ings, 1 5 and these three simply adopted a principle of the Magna Carta:
Property could not be taken without the consent of either the owner or the
legislature. 6 In practice, it was the legislature, rather than the owner,
which authorized the taking.17
11. Letter from Governor Bellomont to the Lords of Trade (Jan. 2, 1701), quoted in Mensch,
supra note 4, at 667.
A series of early eighteenth century parliamentary statutes provides another striking invocation of a
power not contained in grants. See 2 Geo. II, ch. 35 (1729); 8 Geo. I, ch. 12 (1721); 9 Anne, ch. 17
(1710). Under these acts, white pines growing on certain categories of undeveloped land became
crown property. For a discussion of the effect of these laws, see Mayo, The King's Woods, 54 MASS.
HIST. Soc'Y PROC. 50 (1920). For an analysis of the case of Leighton v. Frost (P.C. 1739), in which
a Massachusetts citizen whose pine trees had been cut down by a crown agent unsuccessfully sued
that agent, see J. SMITH, supra note 6, at 328-33.
Though not a takings case, Winthrop v. Lechmere also suggests the state's power to overturn previ-
ously respected ownership claims. There, the King in Council declared "Null and Void" the
Connecticut intestate act, even though the act had been in place for thirty years and many colonial
residents traced their ownership claims to distributions made under the act. Winthrop v. Lechmere
(P.C. 1728), reprinted in 7 PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT 578, 578 (1873);
see also J. SMITH, supra note 6, at 537-51 (discussing the case). For a discussion of the "hierarchi-
cal" element in colonial thinking about property, see Mensch, supra note 4, at 644-46.
12. All of the states, except South Carolina, passed acts confiscating loyalist estates. A. NEVINS,
THE AMERICAN STATES DURING AND AFTER THE REVOLUTION 507 (1924).
13. See, e.g., An Act to declare and ascertain the rights of citizens of this state to private roads or
ways, Md. Stats. ch. XLIX (1785); An Act for the better laying out, regulating and keeping in
Repair, all common and public Highways and private roads, N.Y. Stats. ch. LII (1784).
14. See, e.g., Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 Dall. 357 (Pa. 1788) (denying compensation for such a
seizure); 1 S. TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CON-
STITUTION AND LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, Book
I at 305-06 (Philadelphia 1803) (during revolutionary war, supplies for army "too frequently ob-
tained" through uncompensated takings).
15. The states that had takings clauses were Maryland, New York, and North Carolina. For the
relevant clauses, see 3 F. THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHAR-
TERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES, Now OR HERE-
TOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1688 (1909) (Maryland); 5 id. at 2632 (New
York); 5 id. at 2788 (North Carolina).
16. The relevant Magna Carta provision holds, "No free man shall be ... disseised . . . except
by the lawful judgement of his peers or by the law of the land." MAGNA CARTA art. 39.
17. See, e.g., An Act to declare and ascertain the rights of citizens of this state to private roads or
ways, Md. Stats. eh. XLIX (1785); An Act for the better laying out, regulating and keeping in
Repair, all common and public Highways and private roads, N.Y. Stats. ch. LII (1784).
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B. Republican Ideology and the Right to Property
The failure to establish this safeguard for property rights was consistent
with central tenets of republicanism, the reigning ideology of 1776.18 At
the center of republican thought lay a belief in a common good and a
conception of society as an organic whole. The state's proper role coii-
sisted in large part of fostering virtue, of making the individual unselfishly
devote himself to the common good.19 Individual rights played no more
than a secondary role in republican thought. ° As one historian has noted,
"The sacrifice of individual interests to the greater good of the whole
formed the essence of republicanism . "...21
The role of property in this school of thought was complex. Ownership
of a certain amount of property-such as a farm or a workshop-was
necessary for participation in the polity. A man dependent on others for
his livelihood did what they wanted him to do. He lacked the indepen-
dence necessary to pursue the common good. 22 At the same time, the pos-
session and pursuit of property could corrupt and lead the individual to
place personal before public interest. Celebrations of self-denial and de-
nunciations of commerce, of luxury, and of speculation were common ele-
ments in republican rhetoric.23 Many republican thinkers pilloried great
wealth: Wealth encouraged greed in its possessors and enabled them to
wield undue power. Moreover, the monopolization of possessions by a few
denied to others the minimum of property that they needed to be full
participants in the republican polity.24
Drawing on these premises, a major strand of republican thought held
18. As J.G.A. Pocock has observed, "Not all Americans were schooled in this [the republican]
tradition, but there was (it would almost appear) no alternative tradition in which to be schooled." J.
POCOCK, supra note 1, at 507. Republicanism provided the intellectual basis for the American chal-
lenge to British rule, see supra note 1, and many who at other times rejected traditional republican
thought embraced it during the first years of the war. See D. McCoy, THE ELUSIVE REPUBLIC:
POLITICAL ECONOMY IN JEFFERSONIAN AMERICA 69-70 (1980); G. STOURZH, ALEXANDER HAMIL-
TON AND THE IDEA OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT 68-69 (1970); Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the
Right to Property in Revolutionary America, 19 J.L. & ECON. 467, 484 (1976).
19. See D. McCoy, supra note 18, at 69-70; G. WOOD, supra note 1, at 118-124.
20. See G. WOOD, supra note 1, at 53-65; Shalhope, Douglass Adair and the Historiography of
Republicanism, in D. ADAIR, FAME AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS at xxv, xxv (T. Colbourn ed.
1974). According to Professor Wood:
[T]he important liberty in ...[republican] ideology was public or political liberty. In 1776
the solution to the problems of American politics seemed to rest not so much in emphasizing
the private rights of individuals against the general will as it did in stressing the public rights
of the collected people against the supposed privileged interests of their rulers.
G. WOOD, supra note 1, at 61.
21. G. WOOD, supra note 1, at 53.
22. See D. McCoY, supra note 18, at 68; J. PoCOCK, supra note 1, at 462-64.
23. See J. CROWLEY, THIs SHEBA SELF: THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF ECONOMIC LIFE IN
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 101-10 (1974); G. WOOD, supra note 1, at 413-25.
24. See J. CROWLEY, supra note 23, at 108-110; D. McCoY, supra note 18, at 67-68; see also
G. WOOD, supra note 1, at 418 (republicanism "essentially anti-capitalistic").
The Yale Law Journal
that the state could abridge the property right in order to promote com-
mon interests. Thus, in framing the Declaration of Independence's list of
inalienable rights, Jefferson did not use the standard Lockean-liberal for-
mulation of "life, liberty, and property." Because he did not consider
property an inalienable right, he employed instead the phrase "life, liberty
and the pursuit of happiness."2 This notion that the state could abridge
the property interest underlay Benjamin Franklin's declaration that "Pri-
vate Property . . .is a Creature of Society, and is subject to the Calls of
that Society, whenever its Necessities shall require it, even to its last Far-
thing; its contributions therefore to the public Exigencies are . . . to be
considered . . . the Return of an obligation previously received, or the
Payment of a just Debt."26 In what Professor Gordon Wood has described
as a manifestation of one aspect of "classical Whig republicanism," 27 a
draft of the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights directed that state laws
discourage concentrations of wealth because "an enormous Proportion of
Property vested in a few Individuals is dangerous to the Rights, and de-
structive of the Common Happiness, of Mankind."28
The idea that state claims could trump private ownership claims legiti-
mized the uncompensated taking of property. As a Pennsylvania judge
upholding an uncompensated taking of goods by the military wrote, "[I]t
is better to suffer a private mischief, than a public inconvenience ...."",
Such statements hark back to earlier expressions of crown officials: Prop-
erty was viewed in significant ways as the creature of the state and as
subject to its demands. In combination with this statism, however, was an
emphasis on the common good, rather than a reliance on royal will.
30
C. Faith in Legislatures
The fact that the first state constitutions lacked just compensation
clauses is only in part attributable to republican conceptions of property
and of rights. It is also evidence of the faith in legislatures that was a
25. For discussions of Jefferson's views of property and their influence on the Declaration of
Independence, see G. WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA 229-39 (1978); Katz, supra note 18, at 467-81.
26. B. FRANKLIN, Queries and Remarks Respecting Alterations in the Constitution of Pennsylva-
nia, in 10 THE WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 54, 59 (A. Smythe ed. 1907).
27. G. WOOD, supra note 1, at 89.
28. AN ESSAY OF A DECLARATION OF RIGHTS I (Philadelphia 1776).
29. Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 Dall. 357, 362 (Pa. 1788).
30. Jefferson manifested this point of view in a letter that he wrote from France in 1785. "When-
ever there is in any country uncultivated lands and unemployed poor," he wrote, "it is clear that the
laws of property have been so far extended as to violate natural right. The earth is given as a common
stock for man to labour and live on." He suggested that America might eventually reach the stage
where it would be necessary "to say that every man who cannot find employment but who can find
uncultivated land shall be at liberty to cultivate it, paying a moderate rent." Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to Rev. James Madison (Oct. 28, 1785), in 8 T. JEFFERSON, THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 681, 682 (J. Boyd ed. 1953).
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central tenet of republican thought.3 1 Possessed of relatively little individ-
ual power, the legislator was seen as largely immune from the temptations
to which a governor was exposed. As the voice of the people, the legisla-
ture could be trusted to perceive the common good and to define the limits
of individual rights. Operating on these assumptions, the authors of the
constitutions made the legislature the dominant branch of state govern-
ment. The ability to take property and provide compensation as it saw fit
was a typical example of the enormous discretionary power that the first
constitutions gave legislative bodies.3 2 Through the legislature, the people
would govern themselves wisely. "All property," Thomas Paine asserted,
"is safe under their [the people's] protection." 3
While republicans believed that a body of legislators would act wisely,
they brooded almost obsessively about the corruption that they believed
great individual power had produced in England.3 4 By emasculating the
executive, the framers of the first state constitutions sought to ensure that
similar abuses would not occur in this country. 5 The first takings
clauses-which barred the executive from taking property 3 -did not re-
flect a changing view of property rights. Rather, they represented only one
of many limitations imposed on gubernatorial action.37
II. THE BIRTH OF THE JUST COMPENSATION REQUIREMENT
The Vermont Constitution of 1777, the Massachusetts Constitution of
1780, and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 all required just compensa-
tion for governmental taking of private property. Adoption of these clauses
evidenced a growing rejection of traditional republican ideology, a decline
of faith in legislatures, and a new concern for individual
rights-particularly property rights.
31. For a discussion of republican faith in legislatures, see G. WOOD, supra note 1, at 162-73.
32. For a discussion of powers granted the legislatures, see A. NEVINS, supra note 12, at 167-70.
In every state, the legislature was the dominant branch of government. Each constitution, except for
New York's, specified that the legislature would elect the governor. In most cases, it also elected the
judges and could easily remove any judge of whom it disapproved. Id. at 166-67. Moreover, there was
a "general assumption during the years 1776-1787 that they [the legislatures] were the sole judges of
their constitutional powers." Id. at 168.
33. Thomas Paine, quoted in G. WOOD, supra note 1, at 62.
34. See B. BAILYN, supra note 1, at 51, 130-38.
35. See A. NEVINS, supra note 12, at 166-67.
36. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
37. Among the other significant limitations on gubernatorial power were the absence in all states
of a veto, patronage, and the ability to adjourn the legislature. A. NEVINS, supra note 12, at 166.
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A. The Vermont Constitution
Vermont, the first state3" whose constitution required just compensa-
tion, had a tangled history of property holdings. It was settled primarily
by men who held grants from New Hampshire. In 1764, King George III
awarded the area to New York, whose governors refused to recognize the
land claims of New Hampshire settlers.39 After 1774, the legislature of
colonial New York actively supported gubernatorial attempts to oust the
New Hampshire claimants.40 Even after the Revolution, the New York
legislature was unwilling to recognize the New Hampshire titles.4 ' Focus-
ing on such legislative actions, the preamble of the Vermont Constitution
of 177742 bemoaned the fact that "the legislature of New-York ever have,
and still continue to disown the good people of this State, in their landed
property . . .-.
The constitution went on to provide that "whenever any particular
man's property is taken for the use of the public, the owner ought to
receive an equivalent in money."'44 Although there are apparently no sur-
viving records of the constitutional convention, 45 the reason for this provi-
sion seems clear. A state legislature had attempted to deprive most of the
citizens of Vermont of their land. Vermonters wanted to ensure that they
would never again face such a threat.46 The clause, however, also had an
effect on day-to-day government operations. Breaking with the practices of
New Hampshire and New York, the Vermont legislature paid compensa-
38. While a convention of Vermont residents proclaimed statehood in 1777, Vermont was not
recognized as a state until 1791, when it was admitted into the Union. C. MORRISSEY, VERMONT 89,
100 (1981).
39. Slade, Introduction to VERMONT STATE PAPERS at xv, xvii (W. Slade ed. 1823).
40. In 1774, the New York legislature issued a proclamation demanding that named Vermont
leaders surrender promptly to New York authorities; failure to surrender was punishable by death.
An Act for preventing tumultuous and riotous Assemblies. . . and effectual punishing [of] the rioters,
N.Y. Stats. (1774), teprinted in VERMONT STATE PAPERS, supra note 39, at 77.
41. See Public Letter from Ethan Allen (Aug. 9, 1778), reprinted in VERMONT STATE PAPERS,
supra note 39, at 85.
42. This constitution's legitimacy is unclear. It was not submitted to the people, see Public Letter
of Thomas Chittenden, President of the Council of Safety (Feb. 6, 1778), reprinted in id. at 81, and
the legislature twice felt it necessary to proclaim its continuing force, see An Act establishing the
Constitution of Vermont and securing the Privileges of the People, Vt. Stats. (1782), reprinted in id.
at 449; An Act for securing the general privileges of the people ... , Vt. Stats. (1779), reprinted in
id. at 287.
43. VT. CONST. of 1777, reprinted in id. at 241, 242 (emphasis in original).
44. VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. I, art. II, reprinted in id. at 244.
45. It is unlikely that there was much discussion. In the face of an expected British attack, the
convention on the same day convened, voted to accept the proposed constitution, and adjourned. Edi-
tor's Note, in id. at 79.
46. Vermont citizens had been represented in the legislatures that refused to honor their grants.
Four New York legislative districts were located completely or partially in Vermont. See An Act for
preventing tumultuous and riotous Assemblies. . . and effectual punishing [of] the rioters, N.Y. Stats.
(1774), reprinted in id. at 42.
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tion even when it built roads on unimproved land.4 The constitutional
provision that compensation was due "whenever any particular man's
property is taken for the use of the public" meant precisely that: Whether
the man had developed that property or not was irrelevant.4
Vermont's relations with New York had led Vermonters to rethink
traditional assumptions about the relationship between government and
citizenry. The development of Vermont political ideas about property is
clearly linked to the actions of the New York legislature. Initially, in de-
fending their land claims against actions by New York's executive, Ver-
mont landowners had advanced a traditional argument: Governors, it was
said, could not take property without the owner's consent.49 After 1774,
however, when the New York legislature became involved in the land dis-
pute, Vermont's leaders developed a new position: All uncompensated
governmental takings of property were invalid.50
Disillusionment with legislatures also had ramifications beyond the
realm of property questions. Unlike the citizens of other states, Vermont
residents realized at the start of the revolution that they could not trust the
legislature with the definition and protection of rights. As a result, the
Vermont Constitution of 1777 was far more protective of individual rights
than were other early constitutions. 5
Vermont's experience thus led to increased concern for individual free-
dom. Significantly, the Vermont constitution was the only constitution to
abolish slavery.52 Passage of the just compensation requirement was only
47. See An Act to settle and establish all Highways that are laid out within this State, Vt. Stats.
(1781), reprinted in id. at 422; An Act for laying out and altering Highways, Vt. Stats. (1779),
reprinted in id. at 328.
48. Other than the statutes, see supra note 47, there is little evidence regarding the reach of the
clause. The first reported Vermont compensation cases date from the 1830's. The courts in those cases
required that compensation be paid to individuals on whose lands roads were built, but the opinions
are brief and unilluminating. See Warren v. Bunnell, 11 Vt. 600 (1839); Patchen v. Morrison, 3 Vt.
590 (1831).
49. See, e.g., Letter from Ethan Allen, et al., to William Tyron (June 5, 1772), reprinted in
VERMONT STATE PAPERS, supra note 39, at 24, 27 ("[T]he transferring or alienation of property is a
sacred prerogative of the true owner.-Kings and Governors cannot intermeddle therewith.").
50. See, e.g., Remonstrance of Ethan Allen, et al. (April 26, 1774), reprinted in id. at 49, 49:
[Ilt appears, by a late set of laws passed by the legislature thereof [the New York legislature],
that the lives and properties of the New-Hampshire settlers are manifestly struck at . . . . [Ble
it known to that despotic fraternity of law-makers and law-breakers, that we will not be fooled
or frightened out of our property.
(emphasis in original).
51. The Vermont Constitution was one of ten state constitutions adopted in either 1776 or 1777.
Other than the Pennsylvania Constitution, it was the only one to protect free speech and guarantee
public trials; it alone abolished slavery and required governmental compensation for the taking of
property. It also recognized the freedom to travel and the conscientious objector's right not to serve in
the military. For the provisions of Vermont's bill of rights, see VERMONT STATE PAPERS, supra note
39, at 244-46. For a discussion of the rights provisions of the first constitutions, see B. SCHWARTZ,
THE GREAT RIGHTS OF MANKIND 67-91 (1977). On the significance of Vermont's abolition of slav-
ery, see infra note 52.
52. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 51, at 77. For the emancipation clause, see VT. CONST. of 1777,
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one manifestation of a broad ideological shift, as disenchantment with leg-
islatures led to increased attention to the protection of individual rights
against all branches of government.
B. The Shift from Republicanism to Liberalism
Vermont's situation was unique. In no other state were residents faced
with a challenge to property of similar magnitude. But to a lesser, though
still significant, extent property rights were challenged in other states, and
conservative reaction in these states mirrored the earlier response of Ver-
mont settlers: That reaction manifested itself in a loss of faith in legisla-
tures, an increased concern for individual rights, and the demand for just
compensation when property was taken.
Faith in legislatures and belief in the existence of a community of inter-
ests among citizens had developed at a time when local legislatures op-
posed crown officials and defended the common causes of the colonists.
Once the state legislatures came to rule in their own right, however, social
divisions that had been masked during the struggle with royal governors
were exposed.53 Revolutionary legislatures confiscated the land of loyal-
ists; through stay laws and the issuance of paper money, they aided debt-
ors at the expense of creditors. 4
As legislatures began to take actions with such redistributive conse-
quences, many individuals reexamined and rejected the republican ortho-
doxy.55 Loss of faith in legislatures was common,56 but the critique of
ch. I, art. I, reprinted in VERMONT STATE PAPERS, supra note 39, at 244. The other two important
revolutionary era documents in the movement toward a just compensation requirement-the Massa-
chusetts Constitution of 1780 and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787-also provided significant tri-
umphs for the antislavery movement. The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 was judicially deter-
mined to require total manumission. See R. CovERt, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 43-50 (1975). The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 barred slavery from the territo-
ries. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 51, at 102. These parallels provide support for the view that the just
compensation movement was part of a larger ideological shift, and an important part of that shift was
increased concern with individual rights. Apparently, that concern could manifest itself in opposition
to slavery, as well as in support for a just compensation requirement. Moreover, since in none of these
cases was compensation provided for freed slaves, in this instance general support for individual rights
was more powerful than specific support for just compensation.
53. For a discussion of emerging tensions, see J. POLE, Property and Law in the American Re-
public, in PATHS TO THE AMERICAN PAST 75, 86-87 (1979); G. WOOD, supra note 1, at 396-403.
54. See A. NEVINS, supra note 12, at 507, 569-72.
55. The resultant shifts in ideology were sometimes dramatic. For example, at the start of the
Revolution John Adams enthusiastically declared that "a democratical despotism is a contradiction in
terms." Adams, Novanglus, quoted in G. WOOD, supra note 1, at 63. By the end of the revolutionary
era, his optimistic faith in popular government had disappeared. "Where the people have a voice, and
there is no balance," he wrote, "there will be everlasting fluctuations, revolutions, and horrors." I J.
ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 382 (London
1787). For an excellent discussion of the transformation in Adams' thought, see J. HOWE, THE
CHANGING POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JOHN ADAMS (1966).
56. Judge Alexander Hanson expressed the thoughts of many when he wrote in 1784, "[Tlhe acts
of almost every legislature have uniformly tended to disgust its citizens and annihilate its credit
Vol. 94: 694, 1985
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republicanism went beyond attacks on legislatures. When the diversity of
economic interests manifested itself in political struggle, many rejected the
idea that a readily discernible common good existed.5 7  Republicans
stressed the harmony in American society and the role of self-denial and
austerity in promoting public welfare. The emerging non-republican
school of thought, to which such politicians as John Adams,5" Benjamin
Lincoln,5 James Madison, 0 and Theophilus Parsons61 belonged, empha-
sized societal tensions and the benefits to be derived from self-interest.6 2
Non-republicans had a more expansive view than republicans of which
rights could not be undermined by the state.63 They sought to create a
large sphere within which the individual could exercise privileges and en-
joy immunities free from state interference. Their focus on individual
rights and their essentially atomistic view of society characterized these
non-republicans as liberal thinkers.
These liberals stressed the fundamental characters of the property right.
The first state constitutions, they argued, had ignored that right. The his-
tory of the revolutionary era demonstrated that the right deserved recogni-
tion and needed special protection from legislative interference.
6 4
..... " A. HANSON, POLITICAL SCHEMES AND CALCULATIONS, ADDRESSED TO THE CITIZENS OF
MARYLAND 1 (Annapolis 1784). On the loss of faith in legislatures, see G. WOOD, supra note 1, at
403-09.
57. James Madison, for example, attacked the belief that individuals in a society "have all pre-
cisely the same interests, and the same feelings in every respect." Letter from James Madison to
Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 10 J. MADISON, THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 212 (R.
Rutland ed. 1977). John Adams came to believe that societies were inevitably divided into the many
and the few, each with its own conflicting ends. See 1 J. ADAMS, supra note 55, at 372-382. See
generally J. POCOCK, supra note 1, at 522 (preconditions of common good no longer seen as
realizable).
58. The best example of Adams' thought at the end of the revolutionary era is J. ADAMS, supra
note 55.
59. For the political philosophy of Lincoln, a general and Massachusetts politician, see his ten
articles that appeared weekly under the title The Free Republican in the Independent Chronicle from
November 24, 1785 through February 9, 1786.
60. For a discussion of Madison's philosophy, see infra pp. 709-10.
61. The most important work of Parsons, who later became Chief Justice of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, is Parsons, Essex Result, reprinted in T. PARSONS, MEMOIR OF
THEOPHILUS PARSONS 359 (Boston 1859).
62. For an analysis of this emphasis on tensions in society, see J. PoCOCK, supra note 1, at
522-23; G. WOOD, supra note 1, at 606-15.
63. Definition of this new rights theory is beyond the scope of this Note, but it had manifestations
other than the demand for just compensation. For example, the religious freedom clause of the
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 provoked a debate between traditional republicans, who advocated
public funding of certain religious groups as a way of promoting morality, and individuals who re-
jected the traditional viewpoint and argued that such support infringed religious freedom. See S.
PATTERSON, POLITICAL PARTIES IN REVOLUTIONARY MASSACHUSETTS 224-25 (1973). See also
supra notes 51-52 (discussing rights recognized by Vermont Constitution of 1777).
64. See Lincoln, The Free Republican, Independent Chron., Dec. 29, 1785, at I (the propertied
should elect the upper house of the legislature); Madison, Observations on Jefferson's Draft of a
Constitution for Virginia, in 8 T. JEFFERSON, supra note 30, at 308, 310; Parsons, supra note 61, at
372 (laws affecting property should receive the assent of those "who possess a major part of the
property in the state").
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C. The Massachusetts Constitution and the Northwest Ordinance
The inclusion of just compensation clauses in the Massachusetts Consti-
tution of 1780 and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 took place against
this backdrop of fear of legislatures and heightened concern for individual
rights. Concern about the potential for legislative attacks on property was
particularly intense in Massachusetts, where battles between interest
groups dominated state politics."5 The turmoil left its imprint on men of
conservative inclination. For example, in 1778 Theophilus Parsons argued
in his influential Essex Result that a polity inevitably consisted of two
groups with sharply conflicting interests: men with property and men
without it.66 Fear that an unrestrained legislature would undermine prop-
erty interests animated Parsons and many others in mercantile eastern
Massachusetts.67 Failure to provide adequate protection for property was
a major reason why Massachusetts voters rejected the proposed state con-
stitution of 1778.68
The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 embraced the new insight that
society was composed of groups whose interests irreconcilably diverged.
This constitution, whose ratification has generally been regarded as a vic-
tory for propertied interests,69 contained numerous safeguards for prop-
erty rights,"0 including a just compensation clause."1
65. In the years preceding the state constitutional convention of 1780, the rural western part of
the state was near rebellion against eastern authorities because of the perceived unfairness of the
debtor-creditor laws. S. PATTERSON, supra note 63, at 136-37. The issue of confiscation of loyalist
property was a divisive political question for years; passage of broad confiscation acts in 1779 was a
triumph for agrarian and liberal forces and a source of outrage for merchants. Id. at 208-10.
66. Parsons, supra note 61, at 372.
67. See R. PETERS, THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTION OF 1780, at 143-47 (1978), for an
analysis of these fears.
68. Handlin & Handlin, Introduction to THE POPULAR SOURCES OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY 1,
22 (0. Handlin & M. Handlin eds. 1966). The Lenox town meeting, for example, pilloried the
framers of that constitution for their failure to recognize that "[a]ll Men were born . . . having
certain natural and inherent and unalienable Rights, among which are the enjoying and defending life
and liberty and acquiring, possessing and protecting Property of which Rights they cannot be deprived
but by injustice .... " Report of Lenox, in id. at 253, 254.
69. See, e.g., S. PATTERSON, supra note 63, at 218-33; Morison, The Struggle over the Adoption
of the Constitution of Massachusetts, 1780, 50 MASS. HIST. So'Y PROC. 353, 401 (1917).
70. The constitution, for example, based representation in the Senate on property holdings and
established property requirements for voting and officeholding. M.ASS. CONST. of 1780, ch. I, re-
printed in JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION FOR FRAMING A CONSTITUTION FOR THE GOVERNMENT
OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 224, 230 (Boston 1832).
71. Article X of the constitution reads in relevant part:
Each individual of the society has a right to be protected by it in the enjoyment of his life,
liberty and property, according to standing laws. . . . And whenever the public exigencies
require, that the property of any individual should be appropriated to public uses, he shall
receive a reasonable compensation therefor.
MASS. CONST. of 1780, part I, art. X, reprinted in id. at 225.
The convention journal entry for the date on which the amendment was proposed provides neither
the identity of the amendment's author nor the debate on the proposal. Proceedings of the Convention,
reprinted in id. at 7, 38.
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The fear of the legislature that led to the compensation clause in the
Northwest Ordinance 2 was both more speculative and more focused than
the fear that had motivated Massachusetts' constitution makers. Powerful
members of Congress had earlier blocked bills for the governance of the
Northwest Territories because they had feared the creation of a territorial
legislature that would rescind land grants. The inclusion of a just compen-
sation clause in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 apparently addressed
these concerns and thus contributed significantly to the bill's passage."
Neither the Massachusetts Constitution's nor the Northwest Ordi-
nance's just compensation clause appears to have engendered much argu-
ment either in support or opposition. Nonetheless, as the continued pat-
Champions of the constitution apparently did not explore the implications of the just compensation
requirement in their speeches or writings either before or after ratification. Abstract declarations that
the constitution protected property rights, however, were frequent. Thus, Dr. Samuel Cooper, preach-
ing to the Massachusetts legislature on the day the constitution took effect, asserted that the document
helped ensure that Massachusetts would have "an untainted honour . . . in all laws respecting prop-
erty ... ." S. COOPER, A SERMON PREACHED ... THE DAY OF THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE
CONSTITUTION, AND INAUGURATION OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT 42 (Boston 1780).
After ratification, the Massachusetts Constitution's just compensation clause was held to require
compensation for the taking of real property, Gedney v. Tewksbury, 3 Mass. 306 (1807) (land taken
for public road), and personal property, Perry v. Wilson, 7 Mass. 393 (1811) (logs taken for use in
canal construction). It was held not to apply in cases of consequential damages. Callender v. Marsh,
18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 418 (1823) (government official weakened the foundation of plaintiff's house by
lowering the level of adjoining road). In the revolutionary era, however, the compensation clause did
not serve to bar all uncompensated takings of physical property. See infra p. 708.
72. The ordinance declared:
[N]o man shall be deprived of his liberty or property but by the judgment of his peers, or the
law of the land; and should the public exigencies make it necessary for the common preserva-
tion to take any persons property, or to demand his particular services, full compensation shall
be made for the same; and in the just preservation of rights and property it is understood and
declared; that no law ought ever to be made, or have force in the said territory, that shall in
any manner whatever interfere with, or affect private contracts or engagements, bona fide and
without fraud previously formed.
Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. 2, reprinted in 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS
340 (R. Hill ed. 1936).
73. Congressman Manasseh Cutler, a crucial figure in securing passage of the bill, was a lobbyist
for the Ohio Company. B. WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 7 (1938).
During the debate about territorial governance, he had worked hard to ensure that the territorial
government would be unable to invalidate any land grants his employer might receive from the federal
government. The draft eventually adopted secured his enthusiastic support despite the fact that it
granted the territorial government extensive powers. R. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF
RIGHTS 103 (1955). Cutler apparently believed that the combination of the ordinance's contracts
clause, see B. WRIGHT, supra, at 7 (Cutler desired the contracts clause to ensure that land grants
would not be revoked), and the compensation clause would adequately protect land grants.
Similarly, Richard Henry Lee, another powerful member of Congres, wrote approvingly of the
protection that the ordinance gave property rights: "It seemed necessary for the security of property
among uninformed, and perhaps licentious people, as the greater part of those who go there [the
Northwest Territories] are, that a strong toned government should exist and the rights of property be
clearly defined." Letter from Richard Henry Lee to George Washington (July 15, 1787), in 2 R.
LEE, THE LETTERS OF RICHARD HENRY LEE 425, 425 (J. Ballagh ed. 1914).
On the legal ramifications of the clause, see Renthorp v. Bourg, 4 Mart. 97, 132-33 (La. 1816)
(Northwest Ordinance required compensation for the taking of physical property, such as the taking
of land for roads).
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tern of takings by state legislatures suggests,74 the principle of just
compensation had not won general acceptance. Moreover, even constitu-
tional recognition of the principle did not necessarily affect governmental
practice. In 1784, for example, one Massachusetts writer bitterly com-
plained that the state's just compensation clause had not affected its road-
building policies: As in the colonial period, under certain circumstances
private property was taken without compensation.1
III. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
The just compensation clause of the Fifth Amendment reflected the lib-
eralism of its author, James Madison, who in synthesizing revolutionary
era trends gave them substance and coherence. Madison intended the
clause to have narrow legal consequences: It was to apply only to the
federal government and only to physical takings. But he meant it to have
broad moral implications as a statement of national commitment to the
preservation of property rights. The ideology underlying the clause ran
counter to the republicanism espoused by the Anti-Federalists, the oppo-
nents of the Constitution. In the years after ratification of the Constitu-
tion, however, Madisonian liberalism came to dominate American legal
and political thought.
A. Liberalism, Property, and Madison
While at least two states had requested every other provision contained
in the ratified Bill of Rights, none had sought the imposition of a just
compensation requirement. 6 In fact, to the extent that the compensation
issue entered the ratification debate at all, the concern was on the other
side: Some opponents of the Constitution expressed their fear that federal
courts would make the states pay individual claims."' Regardless of politi-
74. For examples of these takings, see supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text. At the same
time, however, proponents of compensation secured important victories other than those mentioned in
the text. In 1785, Vermont ratified a new constitution, which had a just compensation clause. VT.
CONST. of 1785, art. II, reprinted in VERMONT STATE PAPERS, supra note 39, at 516, 517. Statutes
in other states began to provide for compensation in cases where owners had previously been without
remedy. Virginia in 1785 for the first time passed a law providing compensation for unimproved land
taken for roads. An Act concerning Public Roads, Va. Stats. ch. LXXV (1785) (jurors to "levy on
their County, at their next levy laid, the damages to be found,. . . and direct them to be paid to those
respectively entitled"). But see M. HORWITZ, supra note 6, at 289 n.3 ("[I]t was asserted by a judge
of the Virginia high court in 1831 that there was no payment for rights of way 'until a very late
period."') (quoting Stokes & Smith v. Upper Appomatox Co., 30 Va. (3 Leigh) 318, 337 (1831). The
first Pennsylvania statute granting such compensation was passed in 1790. M. HoRwIrZ, supra note
6, at 290 n.12.
75. See J. PARSONS, supra note 5, at 21.
76. E. DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 161-63 (1957) (listing
amendments proposed by the states).
77. See J. MAIN, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS 157 (1961); Essays of Brutus, in 2 THE COMPLETE
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cal belief, few initially felt that a just compensation requirement was a
necessary restraint on a federal government that would have little occasion
to take property,78 and political leaders moving toward liberalism had
only begun to work out the implications of this ideology. But Madison, a
committed defender of property rights, realized the significance of national
ratification of a compensation requirement, and included it among the
amendments he proposed to Congress.
During his legislative career in Virginia, Madison had championed the
interests of property. He had opposed state seizure of loyalist property,79
pushed through the first road bill providing compensation for unimproved
land,8" fought against the introduction of paper money to aid debtors,8 '
and opposed attempts to forestall debt collection. 2 The fact that other
state legislatures passed laws similar to those he had fought in Virginia
filled Madison with disgust and led him to reject ideas widely held at the
beginning of the Revolution. 3 As he wrote to Jefferson:
The necessity of. .. guarding the rights of property was for obvious
reasons unattended to in the commencement of the Revolution ...
In the existing state of American population and American property,
the two classes of rights were so little discriminated that a provision
for the rights of persons was supposed to include of itself those of
property, and it was natural to infer from the tendency of republican
laws that these interests would be more and more identified. Experi-
ence and investigation have however produced more correct ideas on
this subject.8
Madison was a liberal:85 The ideas of a readily discernible common
ANTI-FEDERALIST 358, 429 (H. Storing ed. 1981).
78. The federal government did not, in fact, exercise its eminent domain power until the 1870's;
before that time, state, rather than federal, officials had apparently condemned the land used by the
national government. Stoebuck, supra note 6, at 559 n.18.
79. See, e.g., Bill Prohibiting Further Confiscation of British Property (submitted Dec. 3, 1784),
reprinted in 8 J. MADISON, supra note 57, at 173 (R. Rutland & W. Rachal eds. 1973).
80. Madison introduced this bill, which Jefferson had drafted. Editor's Note, in id. at 208 n.1.
For the text of the bill as adopted, see An Act Concerning Public Roads, Va. Stats. ch. LXXV (1785).
81. See Notes for Speech Opposing Paper Money (ca. Nov. 1, 1786), in 9 J. MADISON, supra
note 57, at 158-59 (R. Rutland ed. 1975).
82. See Letter from James Madison to James Madison, Sr. (Dec. 12, 1786), in id. at 205,
205-06.
83. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 10 J. MADISON,
supra note 57, at 206, 212 (complaining of the "injustice" and "evils" produced by state laws affect-
ing property).
84. Madison, Observations on Jefferson's Draft of a Constitution of Virginia, reprinted in 8 T.
JEFFERSON, supra note 30, at 308, 310.
85. For an excellent treatment of Madison's political thought, see D. ADAIR, supra note 20, at
75-106, It is noteworthy, although not directly relevant to the history of the Fifth Amendment, that
Madison, like the proponents of the state just compensation clauses, feared legislatures. See THE
FEDERALIST No. 48, in 10 J. MADISON, supra note 57, at 456.
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interest and of property rights subject to government abridgment were
alien to him. For Madison, society was characterized by conflicts among
interest groups, and those conflicts were often over property. "[T]he most
common and durable source of factions," he wrote, "has been the various
and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold, and those who are
without property, have ever formed distinct interests in society."'86
Although Madison did not believe property was a natural right-it de-
pended for its existence on positive law87 -its protection was of critical
importance. The diversity of interests that possession of property occa-
sioned prevented tyranny, and the acquisition of property was a necessary
by-product of the freedom of action he deemed an essential part of lib-
erty.88 "Government," he wrote, "is instituted no less for protection of the
property, than of the persons of individuals."89
B. Madison's Fifth Amendment
Madison believed that his Bill of Rights would provide a standard for
judicial review of the actions of the federal government. 90 Perhaps more
important, it would have an educative function. "[P]aper barriers," he de-
clared, "have a tendency to impress some degree of respect for them, to
establish the public opinion in their favor, and rouse the attention of the
whole community."9
Madison's rationale for the Bill of Rights suggests two reasons for his
proposal of the just compensation clause. First, the clause would explicitly
bar the uncompensated taking by the national government92 of chattel and
86. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, in 10 J. MADISON, supra note 57, at 263, 265.
87. See Property, Nat'l Gazette, Mar. 27, 1792, in 14 J. MADISON, supra note 57, at 266, 267
(R. Rutland & T. Mason eds. 1983); Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 4,
1790), in 13 J. MADISON, supra note 57, at 18, 20 (C. Hobson & R. Rutland eds. 1981) (response to
Jefferson's "earth belongs to the living" letter).
In these writings, Madison declared that there could be no property rights without positive law.
Stoebuck contends that the theoretical justification for the just compensation requirement came from
such natural law thinkers as Grotius and Pufendorf, see Stoebuck, supra note 6, at 583-84. Madison,
of course, was familiar with this school of thought; he even included works of Grotius and Pufendorf
on his list of books to be obtained for the Continental Congress library. G. WILLS, EXPLAINING
AMERICA 20 (1981). But Madison clearly believed that the property right, for all its importance, was
a creature of positive law.
88. See, e.g., 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 204 & n. 17 (M. Farrand ed. 1911);
Property, supra note 87, at 266, 267.
89. THE FEDERALIST No. 54, in 10 J. MADISON, supra note 57, at 499, 502.
90. See Speech Proposing the Bill of Rights (June 8, 1789), in 12 J. MADISON, supra note 57, at
197, 207 (C. Hobson & R. Rutland eds. 1979) ("[llndependent tribunals of justice will consider
themselves in a peculiar manner guardians of those rights .... ); see also B. SCHWARTZ, supra note
51, at 200 (Madison intended that the rules embodied in Bill of Rights be enforceable by the courts).
91. Speech Proposing the Bill of Rights, supra note 90, at 204-05.
92. With one exception, Madison intended all of his amendments to apply exclusively to the fed-
eral government. Editor's Note, in 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1053 (B.
Schwartz ed. 1971). See Speech Proposing the Bill of Rights, supra note 90, at 197, 198-99, 205-06.
The exception was an amendment, rejected by the Senate, that would have prohibited states from
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real property; this bar was the same one that had earlier been imposed in
Vermont, Massachusetts, and the Northwest Territories.9 3 Although a
broader reading would not do violence to the text,94 the reading suggested
here is fairly narrow in terms of legal consequences. Madison seems to
have taken a rather limited view of what legal rights such a clause cre-
ated: He intended the clause to apply only to direct, physical taking of
property by the federal government.9 5 Contemporaneous observers also
viewed the Fifth Amendment in this way: It applied only to the federal
government,96 it concerned direct takings of property,97 and did not, for
example, bar the federal government from interfering in contracts.98
On a second level, though, Madison saw the clause as serving a broader
purpose. He hoped that it would have a far-reaching educative function.
infringing freedom of the press and freedom of conscience and from denying jury trials. Editor's Note,
in 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra, at 1053. Madison considered this amendment of "equal if not
greater importance than" the others. Speech Proposing the Bill of Rights, supra note 90, at 208. Its
rejection highlights the widespread desire to preserve state freedom of action.
Madison proposed only amendments that would not "displease the adverse side [the Anti-
Federalists]," Letter from James Madison to Samuel Johnson (June 21, 1789), in id. at 249, 250; his
decision to act in this fashion may explain his failure to include a just compensation clause in the
rejected amendment.
93. See supra notes 47-48, 71-73 and accompanying text.
94. As a matter of textual interpretation, an argument could be made that the just compensation
clause establishes a standard of judicial review of legislation concerning taxation and regulation. See
F. BOSSELIAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 106-07 (1973); infra note 99.
95. The version of the clause that Madison proposed is more clearly limited to physical takings
than the version that Congress eventually sent to the states: "No person shall be . . . obliged to
relinquish his property, where it may be necessary for public use, without a just compensation."
Speech Proposing the Bill of Rights, supra note 90, at 201. The accounts of the congressional debate
over the Bill of Rights provide no evidence as to why the change in language was made. For evidence
that Madison did not intend the Fifth Amendment to apply to state government actions, see sources
cited in note 92, supra.
96. See Editor's Note, in 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 92, at 1053. In 1832, the Supreme
Court held that the Fifth Amendment did not apply to state government takings. Barron v. Mayor of
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall observed that
the issue presented in the case was one "of great importance, but not of much difficulty." Id. at 247.
In the years before Barron, apparently only one state court opinion directly addressed the question of
whether the Fifth Amendment's compensation clause was binding on the states. In Renthorp v. Bourg,
4 Mart. 97 (La. 1816), the Supreme Court of Louisiana held that the amendment applied only to
takings by the federal government. Id. at 131-32. But see infra pp. 714-15 (in requiring state govern-
ments to provide compensation for takings, courts invoked the Fifth Amendment as evidence of a
national commitment to the protection of property rights).
97. St. George Tucker offered an even narrower reading of the clause. In 1803, he wrote that it
"was probably intended to restrain the arbitrary and oppressive mode of obtaining supplies for the
army, and other public uses, by impressment, as was too frequently practiced during the revolutionary
war, without any compensation whatever." 1 S. TuCKER, supra note 14, Book 1 at 305-06. Judges,
however, consistently suggested in dicta that the Fifth Amendment governed the peacetime taking of
land. See, e.g., Enfield Toll Bridge Co. v. Connecticut River Co., 7 Day 28, 52 (Conn. 1828) (Dag-
get, J., concurring); Renthorp v. Bourg, 4 Mart. 97, 130-32 (La. 1816); Gardner v. Trustees of
Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162, 167 (N.Y. Ch. 1816).
98. The argument that the just compensation principle extended to the taking of incorporeal prop-
erty seems to have been made for the first time in a case involving state law. See Enfield Toll Bridge
Co. v. Connecticut River Co., 7 Day 28 (Conn. 1828). The majority did not reach the issue. See id. at
48-49. The concurrence suggested that the federal and state just compensation provisions applied only
to the taking of physical property. See id. at 52 (Dagget, J., concurring).
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The "paper barrier[]" would-as a statement of national intent-impress
on the people the sanctity of property. It would thus curb the popular
desire to enact laws favoring debtors, imposing unequal taxes, or produc-
ing cheap money in order to undermine the position of creditors. 9
Madison's essay Property,'"0 written shortly after the ratification of the
Bill of Rights, supports this reading of his intentions. He argues on two
levels for the "inviolability"'' of property, beginning on the level of legal
requirements. Because of the Fifth Amendment, he indicated, the federal
government was committed to observe the proposition that "no land or
merchandize" "shall be taken directly even for public use without indem-
nification to the owner."'0 2
Madison then moved from legal to moral argument. The requirement
of just compensation evidenced "pride[] . . .in maintaining the inviolabil-
ity of property."' 0 3 Consistency with that underlying purpose required ob-
servance of a wide range of personal and property rights. A government
that provided compensation when it took real or personal property demon-
strated its commitment to personal freedom; it would dishonor that com-
mitment if it were to
directly violate[] the property which individuals have in their opin-
ions, their religion, their persons, and their faculties . . . [or] indi-
rectly violate[] their property, in their actual possessions, in the labor
that acquires their daily subsistence, and in the hallowed remnant of
time which ought to relieve their fatigues and soothe their cares.10 4
99. The connection betweeen these different kinds of governmental actions was clear to Madison.
For example, he thought stay laws and the inflationary issuance of paper money "affect[] Rights of
property as much as taking away equal value in land." Notes for Speech Opposing Paper Money,
supra note 81, at 158. By appealing to the "paper barrier[]" of the Fifth Amendment, he tried to
convince others of the illegitimacy of a variety of laws affecting property.
Recently, Professor Richard Epstein has argued for a broad reading of the Fifth Amendment. See
Epstein, Not Deference, But Doctrine: The Eminent Domain Clause, 1982 SuP. CT. REV. 351 (1983);
Epstein, Taxation, Regulation and Confiscation, 20 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 433 (1982) (arguing that
the "disproportionate impact" principle of eminent domain law be applied in analyzing the constitu-
tionality of taxation and regulation). Epstein's analysis is at once too broad and precisely accurate. It
is too broad in the sense that Madison never intended that the judiciary review tax legislation, to use
one of Epstein's examples, for compliance with the Fifth Amendment; Madison would have limited
such review to cases concerning the physical taking of real and personal property. At the same time,
Madison thought the amendment had symbolic importance. It demonstrated a national commitment to
property rights and to the proposition that laws affecting property would not single out particular
groups and impose unfair burdens on them. Thus, in his essay Property, Madison suggested that
"unequal taxes that oppress one species of property and reward another species" violated the underly-
ing principle of the Fifth Amendment: the "inviolability" of property. Property, supra note 87, at 267.
Epstein's view of the legal ramifications of the Fifth Amendment accords with Madison's view of its
moral implications.
100. Property, supra note 87, at 267.
101. Id.
102. Id. (emphasis in original).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 267-68 (emphasis in original).
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just Compensation Clause
In Madison's view, then, enunciation of the just compensation principle in
the Bill of Rights had extremely broad ramifications.
C. The Reaction to the Bill of Rights
Passage of the Bill of Rights has traditionally been seen as an Anti-
Federalist victory. 05 According to such interpretations, the opponents of
the constitutions feared a strong national government and demanded a bill
of rights in order to ensure that the government did not undermine indi-
vidual liberties. After initial hesitation, the Federalists complied with
these demands.'0°
Ratification of the amendments should, then, have been rapid and une-
ventful. It was not. When it was proposed, Madison's Bill of Rights met
with an unenthusiastic response. Congressional reaction was mixed, 01 op-
ponents at the state level delayed ratification for two years,' 0 8 and three of
the states failed to ratify it.'0
A reexamination of Anti-Federalist rights theory may offer an explana-
tion for the relatively unfavorable reception accorded Madison's amend-
ments. Various historians have suggested that the Anti-Federalists re-
mained largely faithful to traditional republican ideology." 0 If this is true,
the history of just compensation suggests that the philosophy of the Bill of
Rights dramatically differed from the philosophy of the Anti-
Federalists."'
The Anti-Federalists apparently voiced no opposition to the just com-
pensation clause. Since the amendment was intended to bind only the fed-
eral government," 2 these critics of the Constitution had no reason to op-
pose the compensation requirement: Their fear was that the federal
government would be too strong, not too weak."' At the same time, in
105. See, e.g., J. MAIN, supra note 77, at 255; R. RUTLAND, THE ORDEAL OF THE CONSTITU-
TION: THE ANTIFEDERALISTS AND THE RATIFICATION STRUGGLE OF 1787-1788, at 32-34 (1966);
H. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 65 (1981). Countless historical works ac-
cept this interpretation and differ only in nuances.
106. See, e.g., J. MAIN, supra note 77, at 158-62, 255; R. RUTLAND, supra note 105, at 32-35,
297-300; H. STORING, supra note 105, at 64-70.
107. See R. RUTLAND, supra note 73, at 204-15.
108. Id. at 217.
109. Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island did not ratify the Bill of Rights until 1941.
Id. at 217 n.65.
110. See, e.g., G. WOOD, supra note 1, at 499-500; Kenyon, Men of Little Faith, The Anti-
Federalists on the Nature of Representative Government, 12 WM. & MARY Q. (3d ser.) 3, 38-43
(1955).
111. Of course, some opponents of the Constitution welcomed the Bill of Rights. For example,
Madison's proposal of the amendments appears to have been a major reason why the Constitution
was eventually ratified in North Carolina and Rhode Island. R. RUTLAND, supra note 73, at 204,
213.
112. See supra note 92.
113. For an excellent discussion of Anti-Federalist arguments for the primacy of state govern-
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 94: 694, 1985
their campaign for limitations on federal power, they had not tried to
secure a compensation requirement: As republicans, their theory of the
polity legitimized uncompensated government takings.
The Anti-Federalists wanted constitutional amendments that would
protect the states against the federal government. Instead, they got
Madison's Bill of Rights, whose ratification they delayed while they cam-
paigned for the adoption of amendments affording such protection.11 4
When proposed, Madison's guarantees of personal rights did not in them-
selves seem troubling to these individuals; they seemed instead largely
irrelevant. 11
5
In the years after ratification, however, the full ramifications of
Madison's "paper barriers" became clear. In addition to limiting the na-
tional government's freedom of action, the just compensation clause served
an educative role: It inculcated the belief that an uncompensated taking
was a violation of a fundamental right. Lawyers representing individuals
whose property had been taken by a state without payment contended that
the Fifth Amendment was a national declaration of respect for property
rights. They argued that courts should honor that declaration and require
state governments to provide compensation.1 16 By the 1820's, the principle
of just compensation had won general acceptance 17; in five states that
requirement was originally judicially, rather than constitutionally, man-
ments, see H. STORING, supra note 105, at 15-23.
114. Thus, in Massachusetts, which failed to ratify the Bill of Rights, see supra note 109, a joint
committee of the Massachusetts House and Senate drew up its own set of amendments. All 12 of these
amendments concerned the division of power between state and federal governments. None provided
protection for individual rights. See Report of the General Court on Further Amendments, reprinted
in D. MYERS, MASSACHUSETTS AND THE FIRST TEN AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION 25
(1936).
Similarly, for two years Anti-Federalists in Virginia's Senate blocked ratification of the Bill of
Rights. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 51, at 187-89. A statement issued by a majority of the state
senators bemoaned the fact that Congress had failed to adopt amendments proposed at Virginia's
constitutional convention. See JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 63
(Richmond 1827). The Senators urged the imposition of additional checks on the national govern-
ment: "Unrestrained by the constitution or these [Madison's] amendments, Congress might, as the
supreme rulers of the people, assume those powers which properly belong to the respective States, and
thus gradually effect an entire consolidation." Id. at 64.
115. Thus, although Anti-Federalist Richard Henry Lee approved of the guarantees the Bill of
Rights gave to the right to a jury, the right to a free press, and the right to religious worship, he
professed himself unable to understand why the Bill of Rights protected other individual rights: "I am
grieved," he wrote, "to see too many look at the rights of the people as a miser examining a security
to find a flaw in it." Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Patrick Henry (Sept. 14, 1789), in 2 R. LEE,
supra note 73, at 501, 502.
116. For examples of cases in which such arguments were made either by attorneys or the court,
see Bonaparte v. Camden & A.R. Co., 3 F. Cas. 821 (C.C.D.N.J. 1830) (No. 1,617); People v. Platt,
17 Johns. 195 (N.Y. 1819); Gardner v. Trustees of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. Ch. 1816);
Lindsay v. Commissioners, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 38 (1796).
117. Scheiber, Property Law, Expropriation, and Resource Allocation by Government,
1789-1910, in AMERICAN LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 132, 133 (L. Friedman & H.
Scheiber eds. 1978).
Just Compensation Clause
dated.11 The rationale for many of these opinions was well expressed by
Chancellor Kent in Gardner v. Trustees of Newburgh." 9 After citing the
compensation clauses of several state constitutions, he declared:
But what is of higher authority, and is absolutely decisive of the
sense of the people of this country, it is made a part of the constitu-
tion of the United States, "that private property shall not be taken
for public use, without just compensation." I feel myself, therefore,
not only authorized, but bound to conclude, that a provision for com-
pensation is an indispensable attendant on the due and constitutional
exercise of the power of depriving an individual of his property. 2 °
Defenders of uncompensated takings invoked images and arguments
that had in the past proven compelling. They contended that a state gov-
ernment could abridge property rights in order to promote the common
good. As one court declared in 1802, citizens "were bound to contribute as
much of it [land] as, by the laws of the country, were deemed necessary
for the public convenience,"" But this was increasingly a minority
position.
In the first years after ratification of the Constitution, opponents of
compensation reminded the courts of the novelty of the idea that the state
necessarily owed the individual payment when it took his property. When
South Carolina property holders demanded compensation for the land on
which roads were built, the state attorney general responded that this was
"a new claim, because it was the first time in the history of our country,
that ever such a claim was made. . ,,.22 As courts more and more found
a right to compensation, however, such arguments lost their force. With
the passage of time, that right came to seem an important and long-
honored part of the Anglo-American legal tradition. The counter-tradition
118. Stoebuck, supra note 6, at 573 n.66.
119. 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. Ch. 1816).
120. Id. at 167 (emphasis in original).
121. M'Clenachan v. Curwin, 3 Yeates 362, 373 (Pa. 1802) (Shippen, J.). Similarly, in Lindsay
v. Commissioners, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 38 (1796), the South Carolina Attorney General claimed that the
uncompensated taking of unimproved land was "one of the inherent prerogatives of the majesty of the
people, and a power which the supreme authority of the state had a right to exercise, for the general
good and convenience of the whole, and that it resulted from the very nature and ends of civil society."
Id. at 49. An equally divided court upheld the taking: The power of the legislature to take unim-
proved land without providing compensation was sanctioned by "ancient rights and principles." Id. at
57 (Grimke, J.). See also Commonwealth v. Fisher, I Pen. & W. 462, 465 (Pa. 1830) (compensation
a "bounty given ... by the state" for reasons of "kindness"); Feree v. Meily, 3 Yeates 153, 155 (Pa.
1801) (upholding uncompensated taking of improved land for public road) ("[L]et the evils attendant
in the law be what they may, the legislature only are competent to give relief.").
122. Lindsay, 2 S.C.L. at 53.
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of legimitized takings was all but forgotten.12 3 At least in the historical
short term, the future belonged to liberalism and just compensation.124
-William Michael Treanor
123. Thus, in 1833 Joseph Story was able to maintain that the Fifth Amendment's just compen-
sation clause represented "an affirmance of a great doctrine established by the common law for the
protection of private property." 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 661 (Cambridge, Mass. 1833).
124. The heyday of the compensation principle was brief. In order to foster economic growth,
courts in the second quarter of the century limited the circumstances in which compensation had to be
made. For example, they fashioned a distinction between consequential and direct damages; only di-
rect damages were held to be a taking. See M. HORWITZ, supra note 6, at 70-85.
